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“Sneaky feelings, sneaky feelings / You can't let those kind of feelings show” 
—Elvis Costello, “Sneaky Feelings” 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Michele Lee and Tanya Dickson, The Naked Self (2016). Photo © Jody Haines.  
 
 
In 2016, at the Festival of Live Art, I found myself inside a private padded booth in the 
North Melbourne Town Hall, wearing headphones and holding the touchscreen tablet 
which had led me to this point as part of Michele Lee and Tanya Dickson’s interactive 
participatory work, The Naked Self. Facing a full-length mirror, the app on the device 
instructed me to ‘undress and confess’, that is, to take off my clothes and leave a ‘self-
portrait’ by way of audio recording. I refused. Something was off, and while I couldn’t quite 
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put my finger on it in that moment, I was irritated. The openness with which I had 
approached this work had evaporated, so I stood silent, brooding in the private cubicle. As 
I remained fully clothed, the app, oblivious, recorded three minutes of almost nothing, 
capturing only my forced exhalations of sullen displeasure. I left the cubicle, handed back 
the device, and tried to leave it all behind me. I only succeeded in shifting from irritated to 
irritable. The bad feelings lingered for the rest of the weekend and beyond, as my 
participatory petulance transformed to shame, regret and self-loathing, which have lingered 
with remarkable persistence. 
 
My focus in this essay, to which this brief account alludes, is the particular experience of 
negative affective or emotional states in performances, specifically the minor irritations, 
that are all the worse because one knows they should be ignored or ‘let go’, but simply 
cannot be shaken. We might call them, after Elvis Costello’s song of the same name, ‘sneaky 
feelings’. This epigraph makes its appearance not because of any feelings in particular it 
evokes (which might be read as love or hate depending on your orientation toward 
Costello’s early career bluster) but rather the need to keep them discreet, and the incapacity 
to properly ‘get through’ these feelings. I’m interested here in how these feelings develop, 
how they linger, and the blockages, negations and inactions that become attached to them.  
As such, this paper is positioned within the burgeoning field of inquiry regarding the 
experience of participatory performance, which might be surmised by the title of Sophie 
Nield’s short article, “The Rise of the Character Named Spectator” (2008). With this paper, 
Nield responds to the rise of immersive performance practices, generally dated to the mid 
2000s. While Gareth White has pointed out that immersion “has no strong claim to creating 
either fictional or imaginative interiors in a way that is different in kind than in more 
conventionally structured audience arrangements” (2012, 233), it is worth noting that the 
structure, or arrangement of audiences in these works have important implications, around 
which a broad series of debates and implications, both pragmatic and ideological, have 
emerged. As Adam Alston suggests, some immersive practices elicit entrepreneurial 
behaviour, (2013; 2016), and more generally, the rise of immersive practice has brought a 
renewed focus on the experiential aspects of performance, notably in the work of Josephine 
Machon (2011; 2016), and in Heddon, Iball and Zerihan’s engaging account of intimate 
spectatorship (2012). The focus of this essay on ‘sneaky feelings’ adds another tangent to 
these debates, picking up some of the threads, and lingering a little longer on the taste of 
the unwanted strawberry, eaten to “give good audience” (Heddon, Iball, and Zerihan 2012, 
124). 
 
These feelings are sneaky not just because one feels they shouldn’t happen, but also 
because they hover on the edge of both perception and description. Feeling can be 
emotional, rational and physical, and as Martin Welton observes in Feeling Theatre, this 
“is not only an accident of the lassitude of the English language, but reflective of the extent 
to which thought, affect and sensation are bound together” (2014, 5). In looking to explore 
the connection between thought, affect and sensation, Welton is contributing to what has 
become known as the ‘affective turn’ within the humanities, preoccupied, in general terms, 
with interrogating “bodily capacities to affect and be affected or the augmentation or 
diminution of a body’s capacity to act, to engage, and to connect” (Clough 2007, 2). As is 
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perhaps already clear, sneaky feelings fall within this affective banner, as do the blockages, 
negations and inactions that become bound up with them. 
 
Following Herman Melville’s recalcitrant scrivener, Bartleby, and his steadfast preference 
not to, I seek to trace moments in performance where audience or actors did not do as they 
were ‘supposed to’: instances of non-participation that needle, bother and vex. In this 
respect, I am less interested in Bartleby’s refusal, and more in his employer, the narrator of 
the story. In the wake of another of Bartleby’s refusals, he “sat awhile in perfect silence, 
rallying my stunned faculties” (Melville 1853, 550). Plagued with indecision, the narrator 
is unsure of how to act, acknowledge or respond. He is overwhelmed with a suite of bad 
feelings, which while troubling him, are never quite enough to bring him to any decisive 
act. With such a focus on bad, or negative feelings, this essay also draws on a branch of 
affect theorisation, which might be understood as the “affective genealogies” (Stephens 
2015, 273) conceptualised by queer, feminist and critical race theorists who “give more 
thought to the modes of subjectivity that are disorganized, or noncoherent, or negative” 
(Berlant 2004, 449; see also Stephens 2015). This essay takes up Sianne Ngai’s productive 
exploration of Ugly Feelings (2005), particularly her observation that “the morally degraded 
and seemingly unjustifiable status of these feelings tends to produce an unpleasurable 
feeling about the feeling” (Ngai 2005, 10). I also draw on the concept of ‘cruel optimism’ 
theorised by Lauren Berlant (2011), and Sara Ahmed’s scholarship on happiness (2010). In 
moving from the literary and filmic sources these scholars primarily focus on toward 
performance, I consider how negative affects circulate (or rather, don’t) amongst spectators 
and participants, and how the performances can also serve to function as what Ahmed 
(after Foucault) terms a disciplinary technology. 
 
My point of entry to these sneaky feelings are drawn, primarily, from a stockpile of 
experiences accumulated between 2014 and 2018, from what might broadly be described 
as hybrid contemporary performances. My goal, although it may at points appear otherwise, 
is not a self-diagnosis of irritable participant syndrome, but rather, an attempt to employ 
these experiences as footholds for working through what Seigworth and Gregg describe as 
the “methodological and conceptual free fall” (2010, 4) of engaging with affect. While 
these experiences (and their descriptions) are undoubtedly idiosyncratic, I draw on this 
resource of feeling, mindful of Ngai’s observation that “[f]or all its pettiness, the feeling 
calls attention to a real social experience and a certain kind of historical truth” (2005, 5). 
As Ngai acknowledges, the consideration of feeling and its relation to social and historical 
contexts brings us back to the cultural hypothesis of ‘structures of feeling’ proposed by 
Raymond Williams to define “a particular quality of social experience and relationship” 
attentive to the tones, impulses and affects that “do not have to await definition, 
classification, or rationalization before they exert palpable pressures and set effective limits 
on experience and on action” (2015, 23). In this essay, I want to explore how the particular 
contours and qualities of these sneaky feelings move beyond my own experiences and 
partake within a larger shared economy of ‘public feelings’(Berlant 2004; Cvetkovich 2003; 
2012), which might offer insight, into the “specific internal relations, at once interlocking 
and in tension” (Williams 2015, 23) that structure feeling, and the body of the audience, in 
contemporary performance.  
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One prominent branch of affect theory, which traces a line from Spinoza to Bergson, 
Deleuze, Guattari, and Massumi to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, places an importance on the 
independence of affect as an intensity separate from meaning, signification and intention. 
However, as Ruth Leys observes in her incisive critique, this approach suggests possibility 
of an affective determinism; where “affect has the potential to transform individuals for 
good or ill without regard to the content of argument or debate” (2011, 451). While my use 
of the term ‘affect’ in this essay does not conform to a strict Massumian definition (see 
Shouse 2005), it should also be noted that in many cases I have adopted Welton’s 
preference for the productive ambiguity of ‘feeling’ rather than ‘affect’, to better capture 
the ways those sneaky feelings I wish to explore slip and oscillate between the sensed 
intensities of performance and the cognitive processes of making sense and participating. 
 
The works under consideration elicit sneaky feelings—the low level affects that provoke 
in us inaction, indecision, paralysis—and redirect feeling away from the body as primary 
site, towards objects and technologies. I begin by interrogating a ‘killjoy moment’ in 
Chunky Move’s Complexity of Belonging (2014), drawing on Ahmed’s theorisation of 
happiness, and its capacity to circulate, then move on to Nicola Gunn’s Piece for Person 
and Ghetto Blaster (2015), a work which relies on a ‘cruel optimism’ theorised by 
Berlant. While I begin with a focus on the unwritten rules of the theatre, I then turn, using 
these works and others, to the impositions of the theatre as a disciplinary technology of 
the body. This leads to the second half of the paper, centred on Tanya Dixon and 
Michelle Lee’s The Naked Self, and the way this work utilises contemporary networked 
media technology and culture to structure feeling. Following Patricia Clough’s 
observation that technologies “are allowing us both to ‘see’ affect and to produce 
affective bodily capacities beyond the body’s organic-physiological constraints” (Clough 
2007, 2), I wish to argue that while The Naked Self attempts to reimagine the affective 
potential of mediated networks and technologies, it performs an affective displacement 
that becomes complicit in the techno-cultural phenomenon it seeks to critique. In 
examining my own sneaky feelings with respect to Ngai’s theorisation of irritation, I trace 
how technical and normative limitations shape participation, displacing the qualities of 
the desirable body toward a desirable mood, structuring the ‘right’ way to feel within this 
work, and by inference, the ‘wrong’ way, and the sneaky feelings attached to it.  
 
“Thanks for Coming!” 
 
The first ‘sneaky feeling’ I wish to describe emerged during the 2014 Melbourne Festival 
premiere of Chunky Move’s Complexity of Belonging, a hybrid dance/theatre work co-
directed by Anouk van Dijk and Falk Richter. A standout scene in this fragmented work 
was a solo, by dancer/actor Lauren Langlois. Structured around a spoken description of her 
‘ideal man’, Langlois contorts herself through a remarkable sequence of increasingly 
frenzied movements. On the night I attended, it was partway through this solo that an 
elderly woman rose from her seat, and attempted to quietly leave the theatre. Langlois, mid 
solo, noticed her, and momentarily abandoned her script to wave, and call out “Bye! 
Thanks for coming!” This outburst was, to clarify any doubt, laden with sarcasm. The 
woman continued on her way out, and Langlois carried on with the performance, but this 
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little moment had snagged on me. It sat uneasily, and I was jarred out of what had been an 
artful depiction of neurotic desire, a performance for which Langlois went on to deservedly 
receive a Green Room Award. Instead, I was drawn into another set of questions. Why was 
I entirely unsympathetic to the performer? Why did this nettle me? Did this outburst come 
from the performer; or their character; and does such a distinction matter?  
 
At an even more basic level, this scene was supposed to be comedic, yet because of this 
outburst, I found myself unable to laugh. A sneaky feeling had got in the way of my 
happiness, and hindered my enjoyment. I begin with this sneaky feeling in particular, 
because of its relationship to happiness, the pursuit of which, Aristotle proposes in the 
Nicomachean ethics, “is the best, the noblest and the pleasantest thing” (Aristotle 2000, 
14). The pursuit of happiness, and the historical connection between happiness and a ‘good 
life’ has been productively explored by Ahmed, who traces it from Aristotle, through 
Rousseau’s Emile and to contemporary self-help advice. Notably, Ahmed draws attention 
to the complex conditionality of happiness in these philosophies, and the current practice 
of ‘positive psychology’, which, as Ahmed writes, “involves the instrumentalization of 
happiness as a technique. Happiness becomes a means to an end, as well as the end of the 
means” (2010b, 10). As such, Ahmed argues, happiness not only circulates, but can be 
distributed. Ahmed is drawn particularly to the circulation of happiness within, and by 
families, and the moments where the expression of feelings, such as anger, disrupt the 
collective happiness. Her particular example comes from the feminist objector; who is 
characterised not simply as an “angry feminist”, but as a feminist killjoy. Ahmed writes: 
 
Does the feminist kill other people’s joy by pointing out moments of sexism? 
Or does she expose the bad feelings that get hidden, displaced, or negated 
under public signs of joy? Does bad feeling enter the room when someone 
expresses anger about things, or could anger be the moment when the bad 
feelings that circulate through objects get brought to the surface in a certain 
way? (2010, 65–66) 
 
While few would be surprised that the pointing out of transgressions might produce bad 
feelings, this passage is notable because it shows Ahmed’s attention to the circulation of 
feeling through both subjects and objects. Happiness is not solely distributed through 
subjects, but attaches itself, and moves through things. In this example, Ahmed’s object is 
the family, but I am interested in extending this to the audience, and the theatre.  
 
Returning to Langlois, we might ask, what is brought to the surface in this moment? While 
not an instance of sexism, it is a ‘calling-out’, directed to both the woman leaving and the 
rest of the audience. The calling-out goes beyond the script in order to draw attention to 
the transgression, a spoken reminder to re-establish the unspoken rules of the theatre. 
Perhaps then, the outburst brings to the surface the inequality between actor and audience; 
Langlois’s sarcastic ‘thanks’ undermining the role of the ‘good’ performer, who keeps the 
audience happy by being happy herself. I am not, however, entirely convinced by this 
reading. The walkout was not a statement, an act of ‘no-platforming’, but a quiet attempt 
to the leave the theatre. While breaking one convention (one should not walk out during a 
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performance) the woman in question did also seem to be attempting to uphold other 
conventions of the theatre, most notably to avoid disrupting the experience of others.  
 
Given my own experiences as an uncomfortable, but dutiful participant, it should come as 
no surprise that my sympathies lay with the walker. Had Langlois not drawn my attention 
to her, I would not have noticed. Indeed, a key aspect of what Welton identifies as the 
“social and intellectual tendency to place objects of study at a remove” (Welton 2014, 11) 
in the theatre is also to remove distractions with a unique kind of wilful ignorance. Which 
leads my sneaky feeling to double down on itself, as taking issue only made it more of an 
issue. I wouldn’t have given the walkout any further thought, but here I am, still processing 
this moment, wondering whether it is Langlois, or I, who is the theatrical snowflake, liable 
to melt if conditions are not just right.  
 
If there is pejorative more emblematic of ugly (and sneaky) feeling in our early 21st century 
than the killjoy, it would be the snowflake. To label one a snowflake is to gesture toward a 
decidedly un-rugged individualism of easy outrage and emotional vulnerability; a slur 
thrown with abandon from the right, and increasingly the left.  This use of the term is 
attributed to Chuck Palahniuk’s Fight Club , where it was used to puncture an inflated sense 
of  importance and entitlement, “each of us a sacred, unique snowflake of special unique 
specialness” (1996, 207).  I, however, am more interested in the question of resilience 
raised by this metaphor. Snowflakes need quite specific atmospheric conditions to form, 
and can easily break or melt. Creating specific atmospheres is also the domain of the theatre. 
Consider the conditions suggested by Bruce Wilshire: 
 
The key to all great theatre is the silence of the audience. It discloses that 
each person has cut the continuity of everyday talk and everyday concern, 
those activities in which one can always find more to occupy oneself if one 
wishes to lose oneself in them. (Wilshire 1982, 80) 
 
Rather than actor or audience, we might think of this ‘great theatre’ as our snowflake; 
requiring absolute silence and stillness to avoid turning into something as pedestrian as 
rain, or, once in a while, hail. Which brings me to a more general observation, of a branch 
of contemporary performance practice that has sought to ensure sure the conditions are 
just right, by placing strict conditions on reception, so as to safeguard the affective 
machinery of the theatre. The use of the theatre in this way, as a technology to discipline 
reception, returns us to the question of affect; more specifically, the production and 
distribution of feeling. Drawing on Foucault, Ahmed suggests that we might consider the 
relationship between affect and disciplinary technologies; indeed, central to her argument 
regarding affects and happiness is the way she theorises affects and feelings as capable of 
moving beyond personal, subjective experiences, and questions the role of objects in their 
circulation. Rather than attribute bad feeling to a person who expresses anger, we might 
return to her question: “could anger be the moment when the bad feelings that circulate 
through objects get brought to the surface in a certain way?” (2010, 66) Could the sneaky 
feeling that gets in the way of enjoying Langlois’s performance point toward the bad 
feelings that circulate within the ‘theatre machine’ and the conditions of its operation?  
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Fig 2. Nicola Gunn, Piece for Person and Ghetto Blaster. Photo © Gregory Lorenzutti 
 
 
A ready to hand example of these conditions is the prevalence and enforcement of strict 
lockout policies. Which brings me to note that I have nothing at all to say about Tamara 
Saulwick’s Endings (2015), but I do have a lot of bad feelings about it. A work with a similar 
lockout policy, however, which I did arrive in time to attend was Nicola Gunn’s Piece for 
Person and Ghetto Blaster. 
 
PLEASE NOTE / Please note there is a strict lock-out for this show. 
Latecomers will not be admitted. We recommend arriving at least half an 
hour early to secure parking and admittance to the theatre. Toiletgoers may 
be readmitted to a different seat. (Malthouse Theatre 2017) 
 
Piece for Person and Ghetto Blaster is another hybrid dance/theatre monologue, which saw 
Gunn exploit the conventions of the theatre to discomfort or challenge her audience, a 
strategy employed in a number of her works. Notably, a particular preoccupation of this 
work was the implications and effects of intervention. In the Daily Review, Owen 
Richardson writes: 
 
So agitated does Gunn become that at one point she climbs into the 
audience, getting right into our faces: there is a staged neediness here, a 
demand that we share her discomfort, as if by simply sitting and watching 
we too are failing to take her seriously enough, and we’re not going to get 
away with that. Do not think you can avoid getting involved. (Richardson 
2015) 
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But what exactly does ‘getting involved’ mean in this instance? As I watched Gunn get into 
the face of a man in the audience on the other side of the theatre, I wondered if I would 
have the courage to say, “excuse me, Ms. Gunn, but the stage is behind you.” Or to demand 
equality in the work by leaving my seat and sitting upon the stage. I did neither. I quite 
decidedly did not get involved. But why? Am I afraid of upsetting the artist? I am confident 
that Ms. Gunn would have something to say should I attempt a reciprocal spatial 
annexation; and nearly as sure it would not be kind. Would I become the butt of a joke, 
and the subject of the audience’s mirth? Or would I be asked to leave? Do I risk breaking 
the work itself; hindering the aesthetic experience that my fellow audience members have 
come to see? Stuck within these conventions, we became the sitting ducks that Gunn speaks 
of in her monologue; suffering the stones thrown by a stranger, unable or perhaps unwilling 
to protect ourselves. In Gunn’s narrative, the duck stays still to protect its eggs. But what 
do we, the audience protect?  
 
    
 
Fig 3 and 4. Nicola Gunn, Piece for Person and Ghetto Blaster. Photo © Gregory Lorenzutti 
 
 
We protect, I suggest, our optimistic attachments to the theatre. Optimism, as Berlant 
suggests, is “the force that moves you out of yourself and into the world in order to bring 
closer the satisfying something that you cannot generate on your own but sense in the wake 
of a person, a way of life, an object, project, concept, or scene” (2011, 1–2). We are 
attached to the hope of enjoyment or pleasure, escapism, humour, of being affirmed, 
improved, changed or even enlightened. As Berlant suggests there is a connection between 
optimism and affect, in that, “the affective structure of an optimistic attachment involves a 
sustaining inclination to return to the scene of fantasy that enables you to expect that this 
time, nearness to this thing will help you or a world to become different in just the right 
way” (2011, 2). While optimistic attachments might help you to look on the bright side, 
remain positive, and keep moving forward, Berlant also notes that certain optimistic 
attachments can be cruel. “A relation of cruel optimism exists when something you desire 
is actually an obstacle to your flourishing. It might involve food, or a kind of love; it might 
be a fantasy of the good life, or a political project” (Berlant 2011, 1). In formulating this 
notion of cruel optimism, Berlant is responding to our contemporary lives; full of promises 
of the ‘good life’ that is just around the corner, but never attainable. We are surrounded by 
visions of the good life on every screen, in each picture, all vying for attention so that they 
might point us toward another gap in our lives that needs to be filled. As Berlant points out, 
“[t]hese kinds of optimistic relation are not inherently cruel” (1), but become cruel “and 
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not merely inconvenient or tragic” because the attachment still “provides something of the 
continuity of the subject’s sense of what it means to keep on living on and to look forward 
to being in the world” (24). Despite the various disappointments, I remain attached to my 
optimism that the next time will be different.  
 
The experience of ‘being in the world’ as Berlant phrases it here is another useful reminder 
of the slippage of feeling between the corporeal and the cognitive. This is, somewhat 
strangely, captured in the derivation of ‘theatregoer’ used by the Malthouse Theatre to refer 
to those who demand a break from the theatre to attend to other bodily matters: toiletgoers. 
The toiletgoer, in Gunn’s piece, may be admitted to a different seat, but is still allowed to 
return to the theatre. The third experience I draw upon begins in the foyer of the Melbourne 
Arts Centre, where I found myself with mounting anxiety about becoming a toiletgoer. I 
was waiting to enter the 2017 Melbourne Festival staging of Mette Ingvartsen’s dance work 
for naked bodies, 7 Pleasures. As I stood, an usher made the rounds, confirming that 
everyone understood the show had a strict lock-out policy. If we left, even for the toilet, 
we could not come back in. I hurried to get my toiletgoing out of the way, as a multitude 
of memories flashed before me of sitting uncomfortably in my seat, praying for the curtain 
to drop so I might rush from the theatre to empty my bladder.  
 
Some minutes later as I sat in the theatre, waiting for the lights to dim, I thought it rather 
generous that the house held back an extra few minutes for latecomers. However, it soon 
became clear this was not the case. This was the start of the show. With the house lights 
up, the dancers, planted throughout the audience, stood up and slowly undressed, standing 
naked amongst us, before finally making their way to the stage. It felt tremendously 
awkward. It was not, however, because of the nudity, but rather because the performers 
did not make eye contact, or interact in any way with those around them. We, the audience, 
followed suit. We sat very still, remained very quiet, and looked toward the stage. It was 
surprising that such a work, focused on corporeal sensuality and the body, could place 
such a penalty on toiletgoing, sidelining the bodies of audience.  
 
As Gabriella Giannachi and Nigel Stewart argue, “theatre, like traditional science, 
produces the spectator as a separate cogito surveying and dominating what is now ‘nature’ 
as object (including the object of ‘human nature’)” (2005, 35). The strictures of 7 Pleasures 
not only attempted to separate my body and its cogito, but appeared to extend to the bodies 
on stage as well. Their bodies seemed divorced from emotion, the choreography driven by 
rules and structures, and despite the inherent comedy that naked bodies can evoke, a 
deadly seriousness hung about the work. It felt like a vivisection, rather than a celebration 
of sensuality. Another kind of sneaky feeling began to gnaw, starting in my lower back, and 
legs; which began to stiffen. I felt the need to move; to stretch my legs, in the way that 
comes most strongly when one cannot. I felt like I was eight hours into a long haul flight. 
My attention was drawn from the glacial pace of 7 Pleasures, and toward the bodies 
amongst the audience who decided to opt out. They may have lost interest in the 
performance, they may have been toiletgoers, or simply wanted to stretch their legs – but 
after the first 20 minutes of the show, and until its duration, a number of people quietly and 
calmly rose from their seats, and made their way out of the theatre.  
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Which bring us back to the act of walking out of a performance, and its particular 
manifestation of the preference not to. In 7 Pleasures, those walking out sparked another 
sneaky feeling in me, a mild twinge of envy. It was not enough to overcome my 
commitment to seeing out the work, but once the idea was lodged in my mind, and niggled 
at me. I could walk out. While I did not, this feeling also lingers, tied up and inseparable 
from my experience of the performance – the house lights staying up for the start of this 
show emblematic of the blurry edges of theatrical experience; the way the theatre itself, 
with its doors, toilets, ushers and patrons, serves as an apparatus “by which performance 
is constituted and within which feelings arise and are shaped or contained” (Welton 2014, 
108). As a technology for making sense; for transmitting feeling, of which these examples 
each point to certain structures and strictures. My argument ignores, I acknowledge, a host 
of reasons for the ways these audiences are restricted in their movements, access and 
agency. It would, however, surprise me if this came as news to anybody; the theatre has, 
throughout history, imposed varied types of physical, economic and social strictures on its 
audience. It is no coincidence, though, that the naked bodies of this last example mirror 
the naked bodies in the The Naked Self. For all their differences; as I will explain, they both 
draw on a disembodying of feeling; distributing it through various technologies and objects. 
Following my engagement with sneaky feelings within the theatre, to a work that operates 
outside of it, I aim to suggest, if not structures, at least contours and modalities of feeling, 
by attending to the gaps and slips that threaten to undo these affective regimes.  
 
The Naked Self 
 
The Festival of Live Art (FOLA), running biennially since 2014, has been a fertile site for 
contemporary participatory works, particularly those exploring media technologies. In its 
inaugural year, the festival included the distributed participant networking of Sam 
Routledge and Martyn Coutts’s I Think I Can, and the live cinema extravaganza of Tristam 
Meecham and Aphids’ Game Show. The 2016 festival included a suite of works under 
development as part of In Your Hands, a commission through Arts House and the Australia 
Council’s New Digital Theatre Initiative. These works were all designed for hand-held 
technologies, and included the audio visual installation Alter, by Tamara Saulwick, Martyn 
Coutts and Peter Knight; the procedural thriller Vanitas, by Robert Walton and Jason 
Mailing; the geolocative introduction service Are We The One? by Keith Armstrong and 
David Finnigan; and the work I am focused upon, Tanya Dickson and Michelle Lee’s The 
Naked Self.  
 
As the brief description of the work on the FOLA website and program explains, “There 
could be thousands of photos of you online; photographic ‘selfies’ contrived to capture 
your best angles and features. How many really show how you feel about yourself and your 
body?” (FOLA 2016) Indeed, as the theme and form of the work suggests, The Naked Self 
draws heavily on the cultural phenomenon of the ‘selfie’. In the context of this essay, 
however, I’m particularly interested in the last line of this description, the need it identifies 
to really show how you feel, an imperative that includes mediated forms of self-expression 
and self-perception, as it seems the very antithesis of the sneaky feelings I want to explore, 
which one can’t show. 
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Fig. 5. Michele Lee and Tanya Dickson, The Naked Self (2016). Photo © Jody Haines.  
For a one-minute video about the performance, see Arts House vimeo.com/162482945 
 
 
The Naked Self was conceptualised by Lee and Dickson (playwright and director, 
respectively) and developed in collaboration with production designer Matthew Adey, 
sound designer Russell Goldsmith and system designer Steve Berrick. The final work was 
an application for a handheld tablet, connected to headphones and equipped with a 
microphone, with which participants interact in a gallery space. The space was sparsely 
filled with an assortment of pastel coloured mats, cushions and padding to sit or lie down, 
and two particle board booths lined with pink soundproofing. Participants were greeted by 
an attendant in a foyer, who gave instructions for the device, and admitted them to the 
gallery space. The headphones relayed a woman’s voice, which calmly instructed 
participants to find somewhere comfortable, and listen to “audio portraits of strangers 
revealing the stories and the secrets of their bodies” (FOLA 2016). These portraits were 
organised within the application in a database of sorts, categorised under: time, beauty, 
unique, regrets, confessions and inheritance.  
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Fig. 6. Michele Lee and Tanya Dickson, The Naked Self (2016). Photo © Jody Haines 
 
 
Following the prompts of the app, participants listened to these recordings, and after a 
certain number of these audio portraits had been audited, the app gave the option to 
continue listening, or to enter one of the soundproof, padded booths and record their own. 
Once inside, the voice instructed participants to lock the door, to undress, and to spend 
some time looking them themselves in the full-length mirror which served as one wall of 
the booth. The app then prompted the user toward one of the six categories, and under a 
button promising ‘more help’, it suggested the following:  
 
In making a portrait, you could start by describing what you’re looking at. 
From that you might want to fill us in with a fact about that body part, a 
story, a metaphor, a memory. Think about what you’ve listened to today. 
What did you enjoy? 
 
Using the microphone attached to the headphones, participants could then record, listen 
back, and save, or re-record their story. After giving it a title, participants were instructed 
to get dressed, and leave the booth, after which they could stay and continue to listen to 
other portraits, or leave the gallery.  
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Fig. 7. Michele Lee and Tanya Dickson, The Naked Self (2016). Photo © Jody Haines. 
 
 
The work was well attended, in part due to its availability within the festival programming, 
allowing participation in-between scheduled performances and events. Critical responses 
to the work were varied, from strongly positive to indifferent. In a striking review for The 
Guardian, Jana Perkovic writes that “[t]apping deep into potentially traumatic subject 
matter, The Naked Self is an extremely confronting experience, but after sobbing in the 
privacy of the booth I left feeling lighter and clearer” (2016). Taking the invitation to confess 
beyond the particle board booth, Perkovic’s journey from tears to clarity suggests a 
therapeutic dimension to the experience. In Theatre People, Laura Elizabeth writes 
positively of the work, but in more placid terms: “It was a lovely, gentle, respectful piece 
that carves out the opportunity to listen to and commune with the one thing that never 
leaves us: our bodies” (2016). Other reviews were less engaged. While it must be taken in 
the context of dwindling space given for reviewing in The Age, Anne-Marie Peard provides 
a description of the work, and rather than elaborating any response to it, instead offers the 
truism that “No experience of The Naked Self...can be the same” (2016).  
 
In a contrasting review to Perkovic’s, Andrew Fuhrmann suggests that “while some 
participants will no doubt find it a bit discomforting, it would be wrong to call the work 
transgressive or deliberately confrontational” (2016). This is because, as he argues, The 
Naked Self  “is in fact only a canny re-staging of the way in which social media is already 
used” (2016). To be more precise, the work emulates social media insofar as it “build[s] on 
the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0 ... that allow the creation and 
exchange of User Generated Content” (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010, 61). The point is most 
neatly made by a description of the work on Michele Lee’s website: “it’s a participatory 
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work where the audience generate the content” (Michele Lee n.d.). In adopting this logic 
of user-generated content, the work also draws on a larger cultural or social culture of 
sharing, and as Fuhrmann concludes: 
 
How you feel about The Naked Self will probably depend on how you feel 
about the current culture of over-sharing more generally, and about the way 
in which new technologies variously encourage or contour narcissistic and 
voyeuristic impulses. (Fuhrmann 2016) 
 
While I am interested in the question implicit here, as to whether The Naked Self is 
engaging with or simply adopting a contemporary culture of sharing, and the technologies 
involved in shaping this culture, more pressing is the contingency of feeling that this 
statement rests upon. To this end, it is through the specifics of the contingency that I want 
to connect the feelings that circulate within this experience and a larger cultural context, 
the first point of which is to consider how this work structures an individual experience of 
sharing. 
 
As Heddon, Iball and Zerihan note, it is perhaps not surprising that the rise of individual 
hand-held technologies has been accompanied by a proliferation of ‘one-to-one’ forms of 
participatory performance, where “the spectator books a performance slot during which 
they alone encounter the work” (Heddon, Iball, and Zerihan 2012, 120). Nor, it is 
surprising that the proximity of both have suggested an increased focus on intimate 
encounters, which, “in their very staging, seem to demand performances of trust, mutual 
responsibility, mutual openness and mutual receptiveness” (Heddon, Iball, and Zerihan 
2012, 126). The Naked Self capitalises on this mutuality, with its catalogue of intimate 
confessions, regrets and admissions, whispered into the ear, seeking to induce participants 
to reciprocate to these exposures with their own. 
 
At the same time, however, the act of listening also provides participants with a template 
for future portraits. This is illustrated by the remarkably similar tone and form of the portraits 
that I listened to. Most took on a quiet, soft tone, thoughtful and weighted: as if to signify 
the importance of these confessions. Beginning with a pause, a breath, perhaps a repetition 
of the theme (confession, time, beauty etcetera) participants very slowly and deliberately 
searched for the right words and phrases to build their portrait. Many addressed their 
problems or issues with their own body (a large nose, an abundance or lack of weight), 
making peace or finding some resolution to it, before entering into a ‘winding down’ stage, 
where, often lost for words, truisms and clichés began to surface. There was a subset of 
portraits where participants expressed their satisfaction or comfort with their bodies; 
notable for the way almost all made these comments “in all honesty”, heading off the 
sceptical listener. As media scholar José van Dijck argues, “[s]ociality coded by technology 
renders people’s activities formal, manageable, and manipulable, enabling platforms to 
engineer the sociality in people’s everyday routines” (2013, 12). The stories never exceeded 
a few minutes – a constraint of the application, and as such, could never build or develop 
into a more coherent whole; and as such, I found they began to fatigue me; always starting 
and stopping; fragmentary. This fatigue was also inherently linked to the use of durational 
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audio for these ‘selfies’ rather than the still image, which demands a more sustained focus 
of attention. 
 
In her study of Blast Theory’s Karen (2015) and Kris Verhoeven’s Wanna Play? (Love in the 
time of Grindr) (2014), Eirini Nedelkopoulou interrogates “the nature of the attention 
structures that the artists create to allocate and capture their audiences’ engagement” in 
one-to-one interactive works, mediated by digital technologies (2017, 354). As 
Nedelkopoulou observes, the increasing economisation of attention in an information rich 
society means that working on such platforms requires engaging with “an attention 
economy geared around promise, anticipation, and a reward” (2017, 353–54). At first 
appraisal, the audio recording, which participants can listen to in real-time would appear 
to operate against the readily consumable visual flow selfie-sharing platforms like Instagram, 
which might be seen, as Fredric Jameson writes of a post-modern aesthetic, as “a glossy 
skin, a stereoscopic illusion, a rush of filmic images without density” (1990, 34). The 
speeding churn of social networking elicits a shortened span of attention, epitomised by 
the acronym TL;DR (Too Long; Didn’t Read), which could be categorised by Jameson’s 
much cited (and critiqued) “waning of affect” (10). In shifting from the still image or the 
video to audio only, the artists suggest a more honest, and therefore intimate expression of 
embodied self-hood; which might recapture some unguarded self. And this may be are 
correct; insofar as the largest companies in the tech industry are also seeking to listen to as 
much as possible; with Amazon’s Alexa, Google’s Home devices and assistant, Apple’s Siri 
and Microsoft’s Cortana: what people say has become the next trove of data these 
companies are mining. However, there is nothing intrinsic to durational media that lends 
it any more depth: many of the audio portraits are notable for their ordinariness – and 
quotidian banality, which leads me back to my own feelings about these portraits. Rather 
than being required to pay attention to my own attention, as Nedelkopoulou suggests of 
Karen (2017, 360), my attention shifted in a different direction. The more I listened, the 
more these audio portraits irritated me, which only led to further bad feeling about such 
irritation. 
 
There are many ways I might describe this feeling. Metaphorically it might be surmised as 
a splinter received by going against the grain of the work, and in physiological terms, I 
could report the prickling tingle across my scalp, the adrenal response that accompanies 
embarrassment, shame or indignation. Yet, it was not a ‘full-blown’ emotion, like rage or 
anger, rather a lesser feeling – to borrow from Ngai’s memorable allegory of an affective 
bestiary, this feeling was “weaker and nastier”, a rat rather than a lion (2005, 7). I have 
quite deliberately described it thus far in terms of irritation – one of the titular ‘ugly feelings’ 
explored by Ngai. Ugly feelings, she writes, are “explicitly amoral and noncathartic, 
offering no satisfactions of virtue, however oblique, nor any therapeutic or purifying release. 
In fact, most of these feelings tend to interfere with the outpouring of other emotions” (2005, 
6–7). Irritation in particular, Ngai argues, suggests an inadequacy or inappropriateness, 
which she traces back to the definition Aristotle offers in Nicomachean Ethics that “[t]hose 
people we call irritable are those who are irritated by the wrong things, more severely and 
for longer than is right” (1985, 106). This wrong feeling suggests a dysfunction, in the case 
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of The Naked Self, of not sharing in the proper, or healthy celebration of bodily uniqueness, 
acceptance and openness. 
 
Of relevance to the question of ‘healthy celebration’, were two memorable portraits in The 
Naked Self. The first was recorded by a woman who questioned why we needed to be 
‘happy’ with our bodies, and if we needed to feel any emotion toward them at all. Another 
was a man, who recollected a party he attended, which turned out to be a ‘naked’ party. 
He described his preference not to be undressed by another person at this party, and not 
to be naked in the presence of others; but like Bartleby, refused to elaborate on exactly 
why this was his preference, even suggesting there was something irrational about it. It is 
tempting to consider this refusal as a sign of repression, but this view is, I believe, unhelpful. 
In her study of Nella Larsen’s Quicksilver (1928), Ngai brings our attention to the way that 
the incessant irritations of the protagonist, Helga Crane, tend to be read under a popularised 
psychological idiom of repression. This idiom, “in which ‘repression’ more simply refers to 
an absence or deficit of expression, and ‘expression’ is implicitly identified with liberation” 
(178), suggests that those unwilling to express themselves are in fact self-oppressing. Yet, 
Ngai argues this simply operates within “a critical framework in which an ideal of ‘total 
intelligibility’ is posited as the antidote to repression”, and suggests that such a critical 
framework requires further interrogation.  
 
As I stood in the booth, there was a turning point when my own irritation finally shifted me 
from willing to unwilling participant. It was, of all things, a subtle shift in the way I was 
addressed by the app. At the beginning of the work, it was emphasised that undressing and 
leaving a portrait was optional, but inside the booth, I was not reminded of my options, 
rather, simply directed to take off my clothes, and leave a message. This small linguistic 
tactic, no doubt intended to gently coax participants through the work, was the turning 
point, an irritation that I felt both as epidermal prickling and as a more cognitive chagrin. 
This crossing of feeling of mind and body, as Ngai observes, is not limited simply to 
irritation, as “synonyms for it tend to apply equally to psychic life and life at the level of 
the body—and particularly to its surfaces or skin” (Ngai 184). In fact, the conflation 
between the psychic and physical suggests something paradoxical about the affirmative 
impulse in The Naked Self.  
 
This impulse, I argue, becomes clearer if we return to Perkovic’s description of her own 
feeling after the work: of being lighter and clearer. The implicit values in this response are 
that lightness and clearness are both positive and desirable psychic states, but values that, 
in bodily terms (of weight, or skin), The Naked Self seeks to strip of their high esteem. Thus, 
while The Naked Self celebrates the uniqueness of bodily diversity, this work (which at this 
point must be both understood as a collaboration between the participants and artists) 
seems to displace the terms and strictures which had been used to identify the desirable 
body toward a desirable mood. Within such an affirmative structure, it is not so much 
feeling irritable or prudish that is unhealthy, but the reticence to share these feelings. 
 
There is something else notable about Perkovic’s shift into an affective register, and the 
decision to share her feeling about this work. One might, standing on the side-lines, read 
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her response as complicit within the affective attention economy of The Naked Self. 
However, Perkovic is a seasoned reviewer, who is very familiar with affective, participatory 
performance, and the register she deliberately adopts here demands at least one further 
note – particularly in light of the contrast with Fuhrmann’s more distanced critique. Side 
by side, it would be remiss not to consider the way that these reviews raise the question of 
gender, firstly regarding the portraits themselves, and secondly, in the way gender might 
inform listening and responding to these portraits. In particular, I have been struck in the 
process of thinking and talking about this work, how the topic and structure raise quite 
gendered expectations and assumptions of participants, stories and reception, that the work 
has an inherent femininity. The audio portraits, however, were remarkable in that many 
acknowledged sex and gender, but moved fluidly around and through it, slipping between 
registers of corporeal and cognitive feeling. And this points back to the limits of Fuhrmann’s 
critique. While insightful, it remains twice removed from the contingencies of feeling, and 
the suggestion that “[h]ow you feel... will probably depend on how you feel...” (2016, 
emphasis added) neatly circumvents not just sneaky feelings, but feeling in general. 
 
Following Perkovic, I want to return to, and question my own feeling, of irritation. Much 
like the participant who did not wish to be naked (but nevertheless did share his experience), 
this feeling has less to do with repression, but rather with the pressure to share, and the 
specific conditions under which one is asked to share. The mediation of intimacy offered 
in The Naked Self, like other social networking platforms, removes a layer of complication, 
negotiation, and of awkwardness of an intimate encounter. While the portraits are 
undeniably revealing of personal, intimate detail, it is experienced asynchronously, without 
an ‘other’ co-present in time or space. The device and the database structure expressions 
of intimacy; which reduces the scope of complicated, messy and ugly feelings; allowing 
them to remain hidden; uncaptured by microphone. It is, perhaps, unsurprising that eye 
contact with other participants experiencing The Naked Self was avoided, and not at all 
dissimilar to an experience in any contemporary public space; of individuals connected to 
others through their devices and ignoring those physically proximate to them. 
 
In attempting to engage with the complexity and uniqueness of bodies, it is the body that 
actually disappears from this work. The Naked Self structures feeling through a digital 
database of portraits which seek to show how people really feel; but develops a particular 
model of categorised expression, which itself emphasises certain tropes and patterns. At 
once voyeuristic, while also exhibitionist, intimacy and feeling in this work are, in fact, 
contingent on participants being alone. This work is, I would argue, one of collective 
feeling, but not felt at the same time, in the same place, rather collected by an informational 
architecture, distributed in a ‘manageable’, asynchronous method. This is to suggest that 
feeling is structured heavily by the mediating technologies, but also by the cultures of use 
which participants bring to this work from their everyday lives. In thinking about my own 
feelings about this work, while I was not able to put them into words, it was actually my 
body that served as a conduit. My impatient exhalation, pursed lips, and head slightly tilted 
to the right found no purchase; my sneaky feelings were hidden by the booth, they escaped 
collection and distribution: my body removed from really feeling itself.  
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Conclusions, Postponements 
 
What good might we take from the assortment of dead ends, rocks, hard places, refusals 
and withdrawals I have catalogued in this paper? Even to ask such a question hints at an 
optimistic attachment, or as Ahmed suggests, evidence that “happiness is used as a 
technology or instrument, which allows the reorientation of individual desire towards a 
common good” (Ahmed 2010, 59). What is, then, the correct tone to strike in concluding 
a paper so laden with bad vibes? Would that I could simply follow Elvis Costello’s path, 
and rather than deal my sneaky feelings, just fade myself out, repeating again and again 
that “I’ve still got a long way to go”. Yet still, in doing so, the mediating technologies of 
feeling come to the fore; cutting up this transmission into supportable doses.  
 
The written medium, sadly, does not permit such an outro. It does, however, allow another 
kind of looping, which mirrors something about these sneaky feelings, and their continual 
evasions and deferrals. Once more, I return to Bartleby’s employer, and his feelings about 
Bartleby’s refusal. “I pondered a moment in sore perplexity. But once more business hurried 
me. I determined again to postpone the consideration of this dilemma to my future leisure” 
(Melville 1853, 551). What stands out about this, is how the physical, technical and socio-
cultural structures of affect discussed in this essay all function in ways that allow all kinds 
of deferral, or disappearance; to shield audiences and participants from minor irritations, 
distractions and sneaky feelings, by isolating bodies, compartmentalising them; and 
distributing feelings throughout networks and across time. In each of these cases, 
disciplinary technologies are at work in the way sneaky feelings can’t, or won’t be 
registered in these works; lest they become a sabot in the affective machinations of the 
theatrical experience. 
 
In June 2018, The Naked Self was restaged at Arts House; and while the pastel gallery space 
was replaced by a hallway for listening, the database remained the same. I went along, to 
revisit the work and to see if my portrait of irritated exhalation had been included. I could 
not find it. It may be due to the algorithmic processes which randomised the lists, or 
perhaps it had been screened out in a process of censorship or quality control. I remember 
trying to catch the eye of my partner, who was seated down the other end of the hallway. 
Instead, a man seated beside her looked up, and we held eye contact for a moment. He 
looked back down at his screen, as did I. It was an awkward moment. But it was a shared 
awkward moment. In fact, for all the segmentation of feeling in these works; it is the sneaky 
feelings that move most readily between bodies, atmospheres of irritation, angst, 
resentment which become collective feelings; a feeling that something is amiss, that the 
disciplinary technology of the theatre (or the participatory application) may be dis-oriented; 
or unable to properly control all feelings. This kind of shared “drama [of] contingency” 
(Ahmed 2006, 124) operates outside of the affective economy of social media, that “relates 
to users distributing personal information to each other, but also implies the spreading of 
that personal information to third parties”(Dijck 2013, 45–46), as well as the viral cultures 
of snark, lulz, and trolling; it is a bad feeling that we can’t let show, for which we don’t 
have the right container.  
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As a conclusion of sorts, then, I want to return to Langlois’s outburst, and suggest another 
reading, that it points toward an older definition of happiness, one we are unaccustomed 
to. In tracing the etymological root of happiness, Ahmed points toward the Middle English 
‘hap’, meaning chance or fortune: “The word happy originally meant having ‘good “hap” 
or fortune,’ to be lucky or fortunate” (Ahmed 2010, 22). Our contemporary understanding 
of happiness is one stripped of luck and contingency: happiness doesn’t just simply happen. 
One works at it, one is rewarded with it. For the actor (and the audience) the strictures of 
the theatre are a disciplinary technology which takes the ‘hap’ out of the equation. Perhaps 
(a word which is also built upon the ‘hap’) this means a different act of getting ‘lost’ in the 
performance; of wandering away from the inscribed affective machinery that structures 
feeling, and being lost in contingency and circumstance. I don’t remember much else from 
Complexity of Belonging, but the affective resonances of that brief outburst, that hap, have 
been remarkably durable.1 
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